Weak randomness seriously limits the security of quantum key distribution

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This publication doesn't include Institute of Computer Science. It includes Faculty of Informatics. Official publication website can be found on muni.cz.
Authors

BOUDA Jan PIVOLUSKA Matej PLESCH Martin WILMOTT Colin

Year of publication 2012
Type Article in Periodical
Magazine / Source Physical Review A
MU Faculty or unit

Faculty of Informatics

Citation
Web http://link.aps.org/doi/10.1103/PhysRevA.86.062308
Doi http://dx.doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevA.86.062308
Field Informatics
Keywords weak randomness; quantum key distribution
Description In usual security proofs of quantum protocols the adversary (Eve) is expected to have full control over any quantum communication between any communicating parties (Alice and Bob). Eve is also expected to have full access to an authenticated classical channel between Alice and Bob. Unconditional security against any attack by Eve can be proved even in the realistic setting of device and channel imperfection. In this paper we show that the security of quantum key distribution protocols is ruined if one allows Eve to possess a very limited access to the random sources used by Alice. Such knowledge should always be expected in realistic experimental conditions via different side channels.
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